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Abstract
Equal intra-household sharing is still assumed by the vaste majority
of applied analyses in welfare economics. Few pieces of work have tried
to depart from the equal sharing hypothesis, but their impact has been
limited by lack of data or restricted application to special cases. This pa-
per proposes a new framework to derive sharing rules based on individual
bargaining power. The latter is dened for each household member as the
share of resources gained by the household due to his/her presence. The
causes of power di¤erentials and their impact on income distribution are
analysed in four EU countries presenting signicantly di¤erent tax-benet
systems: Finland, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom.
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1 Introduction
The traditional approach to household decision making and intra household al-
location processes has been challenged in the past 15 years by several contribu-
tions attempting to study such processes from both a theoretical and empirical
perspective. Yet no agreement seems to emerge over a framework for modelling
multi member household decision making and resource allocation. The analyses
continue to be polarized between partisans of the unitary approach, who con-
ceive the household as a single utility maximizing agent (Samuelson, 1956) or a
group of individuals headed by an altruistic individual maximizing the collective
welfare (Becker 1974), and partisans of a collective approach who prefer treating
the household as a set of individuals with diverging as well as converging inter-
ests (Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy and Horney, 1981, Bourguignon, 1984,
Chiappori, 1988, 1992 and Bourguignon et al. 1993, Lundberg and Pollack,
1993).
The principal appealing feature of the collective model is that it provides a
single framework for the analysis of decision making process and intra-household
allocations. The spouses engage in a bargaining process which not only a¤ects
their behaviour, but also each spouses well being. On the contrary, in the
unitary approach, the intra-household allocations rely on exogenous (to the
household decision process) assumptions concerning equivalence scales and equal
sharing. These assumptions rely often on the equal sharing hypothesis that, as
shown by several authors (i) has no theoretical foundation, (ii) does not a priori
descend from the unitary model itself and (iii) has been rejected by statistical
evidence (for a review, see Behrman, 2003).
Another appeal of collective approach is particularly evident inasmuch as the
coexistence of converging/diverging interests and preferences within the house-
hold allows, di¤erently from the unitary model, for an explanation of dynamic
aspects of household formation and household dissolution.
Both unitary and collective models provide testable restrictions that guar-
antee the consistency of data with the underlying theoretical framework for
decision-making. In studies adopting a unitary approach symmetry and neg-
ative semideniteness of the Slutsky matrix have been systematically rejected
using both labor supply (Blundell and Meghir, 1986, and Blundell and Walker,
1986) and household consumption data (Blundell, 1988). The income pooling
hypothesis(implied by the unitary approach) has also been empirically rejected
(Thomas, 1990, Schultz, 1990 and Fortin and Lacroix, 1997).
Collective models, on the other hand, tend to have less stringent Slutsky
matrix implications (Vermeulen 2002). Empirical tests on restrictions have so
far not been rejected (Browning and Chiappori, 1998), and although this result
is far from conclusive, some authors advocate that it is time to shift the burden
of the proof back to those favoring unitary approaches (Alderman et al, 1995).
Recently several empirical researches have explicitly adopted a collective
household approach to analyze labour supply and welfare distribution e¤ects of
reforms in the tax-benet system. Laisney et al., (2002) have developed an esti-
mation technique that allows the identication of a collective model with caring
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preferences and non participation. Bargain and Moreau (2002) use this method-
ology to simulate a tax reform on French data, Carrasco and Ruiz-Castillo (2002)
analyze the impact of the 1999 Spanish tax reform and Beblo et al. (2002) sim-
ulate the labor supply and welfare impact of introducing the French tax-benet
system in Germany.
These recent papers represent an important contribution to the di¤usion of
alternative frameworks. Particularly in the eld of welfare evaluation, where
the unitary approach and the equal sharing hypotheses remain fundamentally
unchallenged. Yet the proposed approach is not totally convincing: one of the
crucial hypothesis in the model is that individuals in couples and singles have
the same preference parameters, so that identication of household members
individual utility parameters relies on estimations on sub sets of single male and
female households and on a calibration procedure (Laisney et al., 2002).
This paper provides an attempt to depart from the intra-household equal
sharing hypothesis, using a very intuitive idea of intra-household power di¤er-
entials, which is based on microsimulation techniques. Indeed the latter are
powerful instruments whose analytical potentials in the di¤erent spheres of eco-
nomic research have not yet been fully explored (Bourguignon and Spadaro,
2005).
The crucial issue is to derive the strategic weight of each household member,
and hence its power in the resource sharing game. More importantly, we look
at how power di¤erentials depend on the tax-benet systems across countries.
To this extent we consider four European countries with profoundly di¤erent
tax benet systems.
Our approach is similar to what has been done in the game theory literature
by Shapley (1953). His index (the Shapley value) captures the importance of
adding (or subtracting) a player in a winning coalition of a game (and hence its
strategic weight). In the same way, we are concerned with a denition of the
strategic importance of each of the individuals in a given household1 .
The benets of making use of such a measure are multiple: on the one
hand it allows for a possible construction of an intra-household resources shar-
ing rule (or at last of its boundary threshold); on the other hand it allows for
a comparative analysis of the performance of redistribution systems in equaliz-
ing/disequalizing the "bargaining power" of the household members both within
and across countries.
Both aspects have indeed crucial implications in terms of equality, gender
issues, social justice, inequality measurement and poverty analysis. More inter-
estingly, it may also reveal social plannerspreferences about intra-household
resources allocation.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces our deni-
tion of household membersstrategic weight. Section 3 describes data selection
and EUROMOD, the microsimulation model used to derive strategic weights.
Section 4 presents the results: it analyses power di¤erentials, focusing in par-
1The Shapley value has been also applied to the decomposition of inequality by Shorrocks
(1999) and Sastre and Trannoy (2002).
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ticular on the role of the tax benet systems. Section 5 analyzes the potential
e¤ects of a resource allocation based on strategic weight di¤erentials and section
6 concludes.
2 Determining individual strategic weight
In what follows, let us assume that households simply exist because it is conve-
nient for individuals to aggregate into households, whatever the source of that
convenience. Let us for the moment assume that there is no public good and
that agents behave in purely egoistic terms. Agents will continue to be part of
the household only to the point that this represents a "convenient strategy".
In other terms, household members would not accept to "command" a share
of resources which is inferior to their marginal contribution to global household
welfare. The "power" of each individual within the household is hence deter-
mined by a hypothetical counterfactual: it corresponds to the share of resources
that would be lost if he or she where to "withdraw" from the household.
In formal terms the power of an individual i may be dened as:
i =
Y D(n)  Y D(n  i)
Y D(n)
where Y D(n) and Y D(n   i) are household disposable income with and
without household member i:
Clearly, the individual power depends on two major factors: his/her own
original income and the weight attached to him/her by the tax-benet system.
Since disposable income may be divided into gross income and net transfers, we
have that:
i =
GY (n) +NT (n)  (GY (n  i) +NT (n  i))
Y D(n)
or simply:
i = i +  i
where:
i =
GY (n) GY (n  i)
Y D(n)
 i =
NT (n) NT (n  i)
Y D(n)
Here, we are not concerned with the power per se, but rather the power of
each household member relative to the other household members. To this extent
power indexes must be normalized in order to be interpreted as a sharing rule:
i =
iPn
k=1 k
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The following relation also holds:
i = i +  i
where  and  have also been normalized with respect to
Pn
k=1 k.
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a plausible sharing rule. What
we propose is rather a lower boundary to every sharing rule, in the sense that
whatever sharing rule is actually applied between household members, no shar-
ing rule is likely to produce a more unequal outcome than the one resulting
from the pure application of sharing based on power2 - no matter the degree of
egoism of households members.
The previous decomposition allows us to capture the weight that a tax benet
system attaches to each individual in the household, given the prevailing roles
in a society in terms of age and gender.
Obviously, the proposed approach su¤ers from several shortcomings. In the
rst place we assume that there are no public goods. The share of income
devoted to the purchase of public goods is likely to vary across households
and to decrease as income increases. Further, research on sharing rules should
explicitly recognize the di¤erence between public and private goods and adapt
equivalence scales and sharing rules accordingly. Signicant insights, in these
respects, could come from household expenditure surveys.
Secondly, the treatment of children is not fully satisfactory. The possibility
of terminating the household contract is in fact an option available to adult
household members, but not to children, especially the younger.
Further research should probably address the issue of how parents bargain
over the childrens power. It seems a priori likely that the parent who is most
likely to obtain the parental responsibility would in some way incorporate chil-
drens power. Yet, this opens the issue of how much is actually given to the
children. Alternatively, children may be conceived as a sort of public good into
which both parents pour resources, before bargaining over how to share residual
income.
3 Data selection and microsimulation software
As explained in the previous section, the sharing rule is based on a counterfactual
situation. Therefore, in order to determine the sharing rule we need a set of
disposable incomes that correspond to household disposable income once each
member has been dropped. For this purpose we use EUROMOD, an integrated
microsimulation model for the EU-15 countries, which allows the simulation of
tax systems and most of those benets which are not related to past employment
2Of course, the previous statement must be interpreted cautiously: young children are
not likely to easily withdraw from the household, meaning that one of the parents might
incorporate their power, in accordance to which of them is most likely to hold the parental
responsibility.
4
records (mostly family benets, housing allowances and income maintenance
schemes)3 .
Table 1: Total population and selected sub-sample (weighted)
The present paper focuses on four EU countries, namely Finland, Germany,
Italy and the UK. The selection of the countries was mainly inspired by the
desire to have a su¢ ciently large variation of tax benet systems and social
models, intended as gender distributions of market and home production roles.
Finnish data are provided by the Income Distribution Survey, which contains
a combination of register data and information gathered through interviews by
Statistics Finland. The dataset refers to 1998 and contains detailed socioeco-
nomic information for 25; 010 individuals living in 9; 345 households. German
data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) initiated by the
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in 1984. Unlike Finland, the
data are collected yearly through interviews only. The 1998 dataset contains
information on 18; 772 individuals living in 7; 677 households. Italian data are
collected each two year in the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
by the Bank of Italy. In this paper we use the 1995 dataset which contains
information for 23; 924 individuals living in 8; 135 households. Finally, data for
the UK comes from the Family Expenditure Survey, and is provided by the Of-
ce for National Statistics. It collects information over 15; 586 individuals and
6; 797 households over the period 1995-1996.
For each country, we have selected a sample of married and cohabiting adult
couples (i.e. aged at least 18) with and without children, irrespective of their
activity status. The latter are dened as single persons living with their parents
and aged less than 30. The very broad denition is meant not to exclude a
signicant number of households with grown-up children in Italy. For simplicity
3For an detailed description of EUROMOD see Sutherland, (2001)
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we excluded single parents and three-generation households. tab.1 shows the
sample size for the three countries before and after selection. The share of
individuals included into the selection varies from 71:6% in Italy to 59:9% in
Finland. The latter is in fact the country with the highest share of single
households.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (selected weighted sample)
Tab. 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the selected samples in the four
considered countries. Having selected only heterosexual couples the number of
females correspond to the number of males. The average age appears to be very
similar across the panel, with females aged around two years less than their male
partners. When it comes to the share of males and females in employment,
we notice signicant variation across the di¤erent "social models". Finlands
male employment rate is almost 10% higher than that in Italy and in the UK.
However, it is in female employment rate that di¤erences are most striking: in
Finland the rate of female employment is almost twice than that of Italy, while
Germany and the UK are in an intermediate position. Let us recall that the
above data refer to a period from the mid to the late 90ties, and that female
employment rates have signicantly increased over the past years in all countries
but Finland. When it comes to household typologies, we notice that childless
households are the dominant household typology in all countries but Italy4 .
Indeed, Italy is characterized by a particularly high incidence of households
with grown-up children. Finland, Germany and the UK have similar shares
of household with one and two children. Finland and Italy, moreover, have a
signicant share of households with three or more children (above 11%).
4 It should be noted that childless household may be composed younger couples as well as
older couples where children have already left the household.
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4 Power index: some results
Tab 3 shows the average (normalized) power index for females, males and chil-
dren (average power per child). The male-female power di¤erential appears to
be lowest in Finland and highest in Italy (the normalized power index for fe-
males and males is respectively 0:426 and 0:573 in Finland and 0:345 and 0:655
in Italy), which is broadly in line with our expectations, given the di¤erential
in employment rates. The results are more surprising for Germany and the UK.
Employment rates in the two countries were quite similar for males, whereas
the British female employment rate is somewhat higher than the German one
and yet the relative power index for German females is always higher than that
of the British women. This is especially true in households with one and two
children, where the average power of female spouses is :302 and :265 against :252
and :211 respectively in Germany and in Britain. Evidently other features in
the system play at least as an important role as employment rate in explaining
gender power di¤erentials. This is especially evident when it comes to children.
With the signicant exception of Italy, in fact, the latter have almost no original
income, so their power is essentially derived from the weight assigned to them
by the tax-benet system. German children enjoy the highest degree of power,
whereas Italian children have a power index which is less than half that of Ger-
man children, in the case of a two-children household (:128 against :059). For a
similar household, the power of British and Finnish children lies between such
extreme values, with Finland just slightly above Italy. Indeed, British children
seem to enjoy a signicant degree of power in single-child households, whereas
in two and three children household they have signicantly less power. This
is also the case in Italy, where children in single-child household "command" a
share of resources which is almost twice that of children in two or more child
households. Germany and Finland show more of a constant pattern.
Average power index di¤erentials, nevertheless, tend not to be very infor-
mative, given fundamental heterogeneity of employment statuses and earning
capacities in the sampled households. An interesting question concerns the pat-
tern of power di¤erentials with respect to total income. g.1 and g.2 show
respectively the pattern of power indexes by household disposable income in
households without and with children. The prole appears atter than ex-
pected: male spouses in Germany and UK present slightly N-shaped pattern,
matched by a slight U-shaped pattern of female spouses. The latter is probably
due to means tested benets in the bottom of the distribution (which takes
into account the number of dependants), and to progressively higher female
employment rates, as household income increases. Finland, is characterized by
a somewhat atter prole, possibly linked to the homogeneous distribution of
female employment rates across all income deciles, except for the last one. Italy,
on the other hand, starts with a particularly low female power index, probably
due to the lack of income support scheme and low employment rates. The power
increases in the second and third deciles, then it decreases, and then it increases
again, converging in the last two income deciles towards the level in the other
7
Table 3: Average power index according to household typology
European countries considered.
When children are present in the household, di¤erences across countries
become more evident, and at the same time di¢ cult to interpret. Childrens
power tend to be quite high in the very bottom income deciles, probably due to a
combination of means tested child benets and tax allowances which represent a
signicant share of income when the latter is low. As income increases, however,
the role of net transfers (reduced tax liabilities and child allowances) come to
play a smaller role, and the power of children decreases.
The analysis of the pattern of power indexes across deciles reveals some
interesting features:
1. Italy shows the greatest variation of gender power di¤erential: starting
from very low levels of power, Italian females recover some power starting from
the 5th decile, determining an inverse trend in male power. However, male
power in the bottom of the distribution is extremely high, probably due to the
lack of public transfers targeting poor households;
2. Finland has an almost constant pattern of power indexes for both males,
females and children. The power of the children appears to be somewhat lower
than that of children in the other countries, probably owing to greater equality
in household income distribution. The gender power di¤erential, on the other
hand, is the lowest across the examined countries;
3. Germany is also characterized by a rather at prole in power indexes.
The greatest variation is in the power of children which starts very high and
decreases constantly, mainly to the advantage of males. The power of females
spouses, on the other hand, increases only slightly across deciles;
4. UK shares a similar pattern with Germany: here however, the progressive
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loss of power by children goes hand in hand with a widening of the power
gap between male and female partners, probably owing to a fundamentally
individualized tax system.
As we can see, such features are mainly driven by di¤erences in the tax ben-
et system. However, di¤erences in employment rates are also very signicant,
for both males and females - although di¤erences in the employment rates of
the latter are also remarkable. In order to better separate the role of market
and state institutions in determining power di¤erentials, it is of interest for
households of working age only, to look at power di¤erentials related to female
employment status.
4.1 Gender power di¤erentials and female employment
As shown in tab.4, although the relative weight of di¤erent household types
varies signicantly across the countries, spouses and children in similar situa-
tions enjoy signicantly di¤erent degrees of power. For example, females out
of employment in Finland enjoy a signicant share of power (:356), although
the latter could of course be related to previous activity on the labour mar-
ket. In Germany, also the power index of inactive women is relatively high
(:282), whereas in Italy and in the UK, who share an individualized tax system,
the power of inactive women is modest (around :20). As expected, when both
spouses are in employment, the pattern of power di¤erentials in childless cou-
ples is very similar across countries. Observed di¤erences are probably due to
gender di¤erences in working hours as well as in the hourly wage, which may
penalize women.
In households with children the relative power of spouses is reduced. In-
terestingly, however, the presence of children seem to have more of a negative
impact on the female than on male spouse. In households where the female
spouse is inactive the negative impact is probably due to the relative generos-
ity of the tax benet system with respect to dependent spouses and dependent
children, whereas it is at least likely that in households where females are ac-
tive, the female partner reduces to some extent her labour supply when children
are born, thus reducing her relative power in the household. The gures are
relatively similar for Germany and the UK (just above :30), whereas in Finland
and especially in Italy females enjoy a somewhat higher degree of power (:363
and :407 respectively), which is consistent with data showing lower part-time
female employment rates in the above countries.
The previous table is further disaggregated in the appendix: average power
indexes are decomposed according to equivalent household income decile. The
following paragraph will look into some detail at the role of net transfers in
altering the power di¤erentials that arise from the market.
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Figure 1: Pattern of power di¤erentials by household disposable income (house-
holds without children)
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Figure 2: Pattern of power di¤erentials by household disposable income (house-
holds with children)
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Table 4: Power indexes (and frequencies) by female employment status
4.2 Net public transfers and power
An interesting question at this stage is how much power di¤erentials are af-
fected by the original distribution of incomes, and how much by the tax and
benet system. Following the framework set out above, normalized power in-
dexes have been decomposed for each group into a market component (original
income) and into public transfers component (net transfers)5 . tab.5 shows such
decomposition for the four countries.
Italy stands out for the signicant role of net transfers in dening the power
index in households with no children. This does not come as a surprise: as
children tend to stay longer with their families than in the rest of Europe, and
family formation tends to be considerably delayed, households with no children
are on average older than in the other European countries considered. The net
transfer here is positive (on average) for both female and male spouses, although
the size of the transfer tend to reinforce power di¤erential of original income.
Again, this is not surprising: as old age benets are employment related they
tend to reproduce similar power di¤erential patterns based on original income.
This seems to be the case also in Finland. This intuition, nevertheless, should
be conrmed by further analysis. In Germany and in the UK, on the other
hand, net transfers tend to have a very small average e¤ect.
When it comes to households with children, net transfers tend to be negative.
Also in this case, the age structure of the two populations is likely to have an
e¤ect, since adults in households with children tend to be active on the labour
5Replacement incomes in this case have been treated as net transfers, although arguably,
they could be considered as deferred wages.
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market.
Germany stands out for the signicant role of net transfers in dening the
power index. In particular it appears that taxes strongly reduce the relative
power of males, whereas the reduction of the relative power of females is much
lower, owing to lower labour market participation. At the other opposite, we
nd Italy, where public transfers seem to play a marginal role in households with
children. The size of relative power index basically corresponds to that based on
market incomes. This is also consistent with Italian welfare state system, which
is highly biased towards pensions. The United Kingdom and Finland, on the
other hand, share similar patterns when it comes to households with children: in
both cases transfers reduce the relative power of females and males to increase
that of children, but females are much less a¤ected than men. Again this is
probably due to the interaction of employment rate and earning di¤erentials
with progressive taxation.
As in the previous paragraph, it is possible to analyze the role of transfers and
original income across income deciles. Fig.3 and g.4 and 5 show the prole of
power indexes by income decile before and after public transfers for households
without and with children respectively.
Each decile power index has been decomposed into a market and net transfer
component. The gures show how the power index is modied by net transfers:
the dotted line represents power index as computed on gross income, whereas
the solid line represents the power index as computed on disposable income,
i.e. gross income plus net public transfers. When looking at g.3, the pattern is
very similar across all countries: public transfers "stabilize" individual power by
increasing the power of individuals in the bottom deciles and slightly decreasing
the power in the top deciles. The decile point where the switch in the e¤ect
takes place is di¤erent across countries: in Italy, for example, net transfers are
positive for both men and women up to the ninth decile, this household typology
being on average older than the correspondent typologies in the other countries
analyzed. In the UK, on the other hand the switch in the e¤ect is in the 5th
and 6th decile - probably as a consequence of smaller role of old age benets. In
Finland and Germany the switch come between the 6th and the 8th decile. In a
gender perspective, net public transfers have an ambiguous e¤ect. As shown in
tab.5, the increase in power is positive for both males and females, but except
for the UK, the increase for male spouses is greater than that of female spouses,
both in absolute and relative terms. When we analyze the decile patterns, we
see that net public transfers constantly increase power di¤erentials based on
original income in Finland and in Germany. Original labour market di¤erences
are hence replicated through employment related benets. In the case of Italy,
however, net transfers tend to contrast power di¤erentials based on original
income in the very bottom and top deciles. In the UK, on the other hand, net
transfers reduce gender power di¤erentials in the rst two income deciles and
increases it in the rest of the distribution.
When it comes to g.4 and 5, we observe a similar pattern for male and
female spouses. Except that now the e¤ect of transfers switches from positive
to negative earlier in the distribution. The latter is again due to the di¤erent
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age structure of households with and without children. Net transfers tend to
increase the power of female spouses in all income deciles. Indeed the pattern of
female power index is only slightly modied by net transfers, the only exception
being Finland, probably due to the high female employment rate.
In the case of children, nally, the previous intuitions are conrmed: in
Finland, Germany and the UK public transfers signicantly a¤ect the power of
children in the rst income deciles. However the importance of family benets
shrink in relation to household income as we move across higher income deciles,
thus reducing the power of children. Italy has a di¤erent pattern: transfers play
indeed a limited role in dening their power, which is mostly driven by their
own gross income.
Yet, it is not clear how and to what extent each specic element of the
tax benet system is responsible for the observed pattern. This aspect will be
claried in the following section.
4.3 The role of taxes and benets
In this sub-section we will explore in details how the di¤erent instruments in
the considered tax benet systems a¤ect within household power di¤erentials.
To this extent we have recurred extensively to the microsimulation model. In-
struments have been classied into broad groups: (i) taxes and social security
contributions, (2) social assistance and housing benets, (3) family benets, (4)
old age and sickness benets and (5) unemployment benets. For each group of
measures we have simulated what the power di¤erentials within the household
would be if the measures did not exist. This allows us to estimate the specic
contribution of each element of the tax benet system. Again the analysis was
performed on households with and without children.
Tab.6 and tab.7 present the results of such decomposition for households
with and without children respectively. The tables have di¤erently shaded ares:
pale gray corresponds to positive and negative variations in the interval [0, 0.05],
gray corresponds to the interval (0.05,1] and dark grey intervals correspond to
variations in the interval (1,1]. This allow us to immediately see which instru-
ments play a signicant role in reshaping intra-household power di¤erentials.
The tax system does not play such a central role: in Finland it appears
to be totally neutral, whereas even in Germany, where a joint tax system is in
place, the e¤ects seem to be quite modest. This is probably due to an age e¤ect:
as this groups include quite a large number of households with pension income,
income taxation and especially social security contributions do not play a major
role in determining power di¤erentials.
Housing and social assistance benets also play a smaller role in households
without children. As expected, the e¤ect is concentrated in bottom deciles and
tend to favor the female spouse (probably due to lower earnings). When it
comes to sick, invalidity and old age benets, strong di¤erences across countries
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Table 5: Impact of original income and transfers on the average power of house-
hold members per household typology
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Figure 3: Power indexes computed on gross market income and disposable in-
come, by income decile (households without children)
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Figure 4: Power index computed on gross market income and disposable income,
by income decile (households with children)
17
Figure 5: Power index computed on gross market income and disposable income,
by income decile (households with children)
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Table 6: E¤ect of di¤erent instruments of the tax benet system on intra-
household power di¤erentials (households without children)
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Table 7: E¤ect of di¤erent instruments of the tax benet system on intra-
household power di¤erentials (households with children)
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emerge: Italy appears to be a true "pension state": pension benets signicantly
increase the power of the male spouse, especially in the very bottom deciles
(where other sources of income are less likely to be found). Germany has a
similar structure, but Finland and the UK di¤er substantially: here pension
transfers are less important. Pension benets continue to favour male spouses,
but the their impact is rather marginal and concentrated in the bottom deciles.
Finally, unemployment benets do not have a clear cut e¤ect and their overall
impact is indeed quite small.
When it comes to households with children the picture gets more compli-
cated. Taxes and social security contributions now do play a larger role: the
power of female spouses is slightly increased in Italy in the UK and, especially,
in Germany. The power increase is somewhat stronger in bottom deciles, which
is probably due to increasing female employment rates when moving towards
higher deciles of household disposable income. Children also benet from the
tax system. This is particularly true in Germany for households in the bottom
deciles. In Finland the picture is partially di¤erent: the tax system has a nega-
tive e¤ects on female power in upper deciles, while the e¤ect of the tax system
is positive in bottom deciles.
The e¤ect of family benets is not surprising: Italys means tested benets
clearly come out, as the impact is concentrated in the bottom deciles. Fur-
thermore, in Italy and Germany the increase in childrens power, related to the
presence of family benets, mainly reduces the power of males (probably due
to the very small share of female spouses earnings in some households with
children).
For old age and sickness benets, as well as for unemployment benets,
the conclusion reached above still hold, except that for this age group the rel-
ative importance of the two benets is reversed. Apart from Italy, very few
households with children receive pension incomes. In Finland and in Germany
unemployment benets play a more signicant role: they increase the power of
both spouses, mainly to the disadvantage of children.
5 The "strategic weight" sharing rule: outcomes
In this section we turn to the consequences of intra-household power di¤er-
entials. In particular, we have computed inequality and poverty indexes. As
stated in the introduction we are not claiming that intra-household sharing is
realistically based on power di¤erentials only. Solidarity between household
members generates some reallocation from the most powerful to the less pow-
erful individuals. It is nevertheless realistic to interpret the sharing rule based
on power di¤erentials as an upper boundary: no matter the degree of egoism
of households members, it is unlikely that the actual sharing rule agreed be-
tween household members will be more unequal than the sharing of resources
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Table 8: FGT indexes for equal and unequal intra-household sharing (households
without children)
Table 9: FGT indexes for equal and unequal intra-household sharing (households
with children)
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Table 10: Gini indexes under equal and unequal sharing
according to power di¤erentials.
With this caveat in mind, it is interesting to look at di¤erentials across
countries. Tab.8 and tab.9, present FGT indexes for households without and
with children. The poverty line has been computed once as 60% of median
individual income when income is shared equally across members. In g.8, male
and female head count ratios, income gap and income gap squared all have the
same value under the equal sharing hypothesis. Poverty rates di¤er signicantly
from o¢ cial statistics as incomes have not been equivalized. When shifting to
unequal income sharing, poverty rates go up in all countries. In absolute terms
the increase is modest in Finland, but very high in Germany and in the UK and
especially in Italy. Interestingly, in Finland, the shift to unequal distribution
would make both male and female partners worse o¤ - on average. Poverty
risk increases for both members. In the UK average poverty risk is almost
unchanged (although the severity of poverty actually increases for men as well),
whereas in Germany the increase is hardly signicant. In Italy, on the other
hand, average poverty risk for male adults decreases, whereas that of females
increases substantially.
As it is shown in tab.9, poverty risk increases substantially in households
with children: poverty rates vary from 3:8% in Germany to 18:4% in the UK.
In the UK and in Italy children present a signicant poverty risk even under
the equal sharing hypothesis, whereas Finland and Germany have particularly
low child poverty rates.
When it comes to unequal sharing, poverty risk and intensity of poverty are
highest in Italy, which is followed closely by Finland and the UK. Higher poverty
rates are linked to the extremely high poverty rates faced by children. Only the
German system seems to attach higher weights to children: poverty risk here is
65%, against almost 90% in Finland and 80% in Italy and in the UK. What is
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also surprising, is the poverty risks faced by female adults in Germany: despite
the lower participation rates, females face a lower poverty risk in Germany than
in the UK. Yet females adults face from three (Finland) to thirteen times (Italy)
the poverty risk of male partners.
While in theory the e¤ect of unequal sharing of resources within the house-
hold may have ambiguous e¤ects on poverty rates, inequality indexes always
increase when the intra-household distribution of resources is unequal. Tab.10
presents Gini indexes under the two sharing hypothesis for both the whole pop-
ulation and population subgroups. Germany presents the lowest level of income
inequality, whereas the UK, Finland and Italy have signicantly higher Gini
coe¢ cients. It is interesting to analyze inequality amongst children: when in-
comes are shared unequally, inequality amongst German and British children is
very high: this is probably due to the relatively important share of resources
that children "command" in worse o¤ households (due to the generous income
assistance supplements for children). In Finland inequality amongst children is
lower, but in Italy it is extremely high: this is probably linked to the hetero-
geneity of situations amongst children: some of them indeed continue to live
with their parents although economically active.
6 Conclusions
This paper has introduced a new framework to analyze intra-household power
di¤erentials and sharing rules. The concept of power as strategic weight that is
developed is intrinsically connected to the interest of each individual in forming a
household: if the level of egoism of some household member were to push towards
a more unequal sharing rule than that produced by the power di¤erential, the
household member could threaten to leave the household. In this sense the power
concept may be useful in determining a lower bound to the inequality that may
arise from unequal distribution within the household. Yet the framework is not
totally satisfying: not all children have the option of leaving the households,
so that one of the parents could end up beneting from the power of his/her
child. Also the proposed framework is completely static: when calculating the
power of one of the partners, for example, we did not consider that the other
partner could adjust his/her behavior on the labour market. Also, economies of
scale in consumption have not been accounted for: although income is shared
unequally, it is likely that a part of it will be spent on public goods. It would
be reasonable to assume that one part of total household income is consumed
for the purchase of non-private goods and services, and that only the residual
share is allocated in accordance to power di¤erentials.
With all this limitations in mind, the proposed approach has allowed us
to cast some additional light on how resources could potentially be shared
within a household, and how sharing arrangements might be inuenced by exter-
nal/internal conditions. Internal conditions mostly concern individualslabour
supply strategies. These denitively play a signicant role in determining earn-
ing capacity and hence power di¤erentials. However, di¤erences in employment
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rates, especially female employment rates, are only one of the factors a¤ecting
intra-household sharing. Net transfers, positive or negative, also play a signif-
icant role in reshaping power di¤erentials. Tax benet systems play a positive
role in re-balancing power di¤erentials. While some measures are substantially
neutral, others tend to reduce existing inequalities and others yet tend to exac-
erbate the power di¤erentials within the household.
The framework we have developed may therefore represent in itself a straight-
forward tool to analyze the impact of tax benet systems on relative strategic
weight, compare their e¤ect across countries and - for example - assess the di-
rection of reforms in tax benet systems that may di¤erently a¤ect the power
of individuals within the household.
This approach could also be implemented as a possible way to test and
validate sharing rules obtained through estimates from consumption data. If
econometric estimates produces more unequal output than the power index (in
principle, this should never happens), then it would be interesting to understand
the reasons of that.
In a more ambitious perspective, the framework we have developed could
be used as a starting point for a more realistic sharing rule that account for
dynamic strategies (i.e. responses of individuals to the threat of household
splitting), adultscontrol over younger children and economies of scale in the
purchase of public goods and services. These aspects are left for further research.
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7 Appendix
Tab.11 shows the pattern of male and female spouses power indexes by income
decile, according to the female spouse employment status in households without
children, whereas tab.12 looks at the same pattern in households with children.
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Table 11: Power patterns by household income decile and female spouse em-
ployment status (households with no children)
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Table 12: Power patterns by household income decile and female spouse em-
ployment status (households with children)
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